Category Archives: Strategy

Managing baggage trains can seem overwhelming at first.  As wargamers, we aren’t used to thinking like this.  Does it sound tricky?  It can be but that’s what makes it so fun!!!  It is worth the effort. 

Here is the basic rundown:

1. Combat flips your pieces to Spent.

2. Only Unpacked baggage can rally them back to Fresh.

3. Unpacked baggage can’t move.

4. If your baggage gets sacked, you lose.   Game over.   

Easy. 

Here are a few basic tips to get you up and running quickly:

When to Unpack Your Baggage?

The Baggage Trains are critical to victory.  Here are a few tips to get you started and keep you out of trouble:

Defense

Don’t unpack too soon.

Don’t unpack too far forward!

Example

Let’s say we’re running the Feds at Gettysburg, Day 1.  We deployed Reynolds’ I Corp along McPherson’s Ridge.  The Confederates launched their first assault.  We drove the Rebs back and mostly held.  Fantastic but our line is now Spent. 

At this point, it is very tempting to unpack.  We are off to a good start.  If we unpack we can now rally this line and maybe hold much longer!!  Sure that’s true but it’s not good enough. 

Don’t marry the first girl you kiss!  Yes, you need to have commitment issues!!

Unpacking is a huge commitment.  Don’t unpack because things are looking good right now.  Sure you may be able to hold for another assault.  Especially if you start rallying.  Maybe you can hold for another couple of turns.  Still not good enough. 

Here is the key question you need to ask yourself: 

If you unpack, can you hold this for the rest of the battle?

Yeah, not a few turns.  Can you hold this line for the next 3 days?  Come what may?  What happens when Ewell comes storming down out of the north 2-3 turns from now?  What if Jackson and Stuart unexpectedly show up?  Can you still hold that for 3 more days?  I didn’t think so.

With Baggage Trains, you need to think very long term.  The whole battle depends on it, so think in terms of the battle.

The beginning of a battle is the trickiest part.  You need to be constantly asking yourself these questions:

Where is the enemy’s main threat?  How strong is the enemy?  Where can I delay?  Where and when will reinforcements arrive?  Where can I fall back to?  Where can I make a stand and hold for the entire battle?  How can I minimize casualties until then?

Blow by blow, as the battle is developing, all these answers will be changing.  You need to constantly reassess the situation.  Where can you fight?  Can you even fight here at all?  Maybe the best solution is to never unpack.  Just fight a delaying action for a day and then bug out.  Sometimes that’s all you can do.  Is this really a battle you can fight?  Is it a battle you can win?  

Once you unpack, things get much more simple.  None of that matters anymore.  You’re all in.  Now the question becomes:  How on earth can I possible hold this line?  How can I take pressure off and distract the enemy?  Where are his unpacked trains?  Can I get to them before he can get to mine? 

Did the enemy break through?  Can you counter attack and drive him back?  How much longer can you hold out?  Is it time to give up and pull the plug?  It is much better to voluntarily bug out than let your baggage trains just get sacked.  Pack up and go home.  You can fight another day.    

Offense

For Offense, unpacking is more simple.  Two key questions:

Has the enemy unpacked yet?  Where?

Do NOT unpack unless you are sure the enemy already has.  If you unpack too early, you will be hopelessly overextended for the rest of the battle.  You will never be able to mount a serious threat.

Once you are sure the enemy has unpacked, you need to formulate your overall strategy for the battle.  Where is his line going to be?  How can you crack it?  What is the weak link?  Where are you going to make your main effort?  Think long term:  For the whole battle, not just the next turn or two.  You need to plan ahead for this.

Wherever your main effort will be, your trains need to be able to effectively support that.

Where to Unpack Your Baggage?

Now that we know when, the next question is where?  Where is the best place to locate your Trains?  This is fairly simple.  It just requires a little careful planning. 

Work this backwards.

Defense:  Where is the line you plan on holding? 

Offense:  Where is the defender’s committed line?  Where will your line be to assault that? 

Ok now, where will your troops be when they retreat off that line?

Your Baggage Trains need to be able to rally this spent line efficiently.  Simple place them where their range will extend over most of this area. 

Finally, don’t worry too much.  You don’t have to be perfect.  The enemy won’t be perfect either.  Just dive into a battle and try something.  Experience is the best teacher.  “Ah, now I see why I shouldn’t have unpacked there.”  Yeah, well the upside to making a big mistake with baggage trains is that the battle will be over soon.  Now you know.  Now you’ll remember.  Now you have plenty of time to start a new battle. 

I get a little confused while changing into Road Column, marching and back out again. Can you explain exactly how this works?

Sure! Great question. The process is simple, it can be a little tricky to keep it straight in your mind while doing it. This is how I do it:

It takes 1/3 move to change formation. While in Road Column, you move double. So I think of it this way: you have 6 little, 1 third segments that you can use during your turn; at Road Column speed, right?

So let’s say I’m sitting on a road but I’m in line. I have a total of 6 segments to use right? It takes 2 of those moves to change into Road Column. That means I have 4 moves left to march along the road.

How far can I go if I want to change back into Line? Well, just remember it is going to take 2 of those little moves to change back right? So if I’m already in column, on the road, I can move 4 moves along the road and then spend my last 2 to change back into line.

So how far can you move if you start on a road, change into column and then back out into line again at the end of my move? Simple. It takes 2 moves to get into column right? It will take 2 more to get back into line at the end of your move. So that means you can use 2 moves to march along the road.

That’s fine but that works out to be 2 thirds of a regular move right? If you are going to do that, you might as well just stay in line and march there. It works out the same if you are going through bad terrain.

This is a good base line to keep in mind. In order to make it worthwhile, you need to be moving further than 2 thirds of a regular move; assuming you are getting in and out of road column all in the same turn.

Do you plan your moves differently? That’s ok. If you already have a way that makes sense to you fine. Keep doing it that way, as long as it works. There are different ways to think about it.

John Mosby

To me, it’s not at all complicated to distinguish an Infantry unit from a Cavalry unit in PBs.  There’s such a thing as carrying “minimalism” too far, to the point of “bland.”  I might order a Scotch without water, but water without Scotch is simply rehydration.

We are very fortunate to have such a talented and knowledgeable group of play testers in our design team.  We have great discussions.  I often wish they were public.  This is a small example.  Just 1 email picked out of hundreds of our banter back and forth.  I hope you find it as interesting as I do!

Sorry to differ, but saying Artillery in PBs is “not an abstraction” beggars reason.  The Artillery units in PBs don’t represent 1-2 guns—I know you know this, of course—but these units also don’t represent “usual concentrations” except in the sense of portraying sections of the battlefield where Artillery is particularly focused/targeted (and at this, Artillery Range, from the physical location of the Artillery unit to the targeted unit, is still an abstraction—those guns would be firing from other in-range locations, not just in a hub-to-hub line of cannon).

Troops were very accustomed to Artillery “falling silent and withdrawing.”  It happened all the time.  Batteries redeployed at the orders of the Division or Corps commander to which they were assigned; batteries withdrew when ammunition-depleted; batteries shifted location sometimes when particularly effective counterbattery fire (actually rare in the ACW; Federal batteries firing on Alexander’s concentration on Day Three were ordered to hold fire by Hancock in order to preserve rounds for the infantry attack he knew was coming) began to impact them adversely (usually in terms of a caisson exploding or an unsustainable number of horse losses in the battery).

Batteries might even just fold and fall back in the face of an attack (Infantry was very accustomed to orders to “Save the guns!”).  Such things did not disconcert any but very green troops.

Re ACW cavalry, most infantry never saw them engaged on a battlefield.  The bitter slogan “Who ever saw a dead cavalryman?” reflected not only infantry’s contempt for cavalry (especially in the Federal Army, at least up to Gettysburg) but the fact that ground-pounders rarely saw cavalry in action—they were more likely to be deployed to the infantry’s rear with orders to shoot any man who routed (there is a statue of a dismounted Federal cavalryman, kneeling with carbine at the ready, right behind the “High Water Mark” position at G’burg!  He was NOT there to personally help repulse Pickett’s Charge.)

John Buford

Reynold’s troops saw some casualty in Buford’s battle area, but understood that the troopers had bought them time to come up with tactics and with blood.  They were hardly shaken at the sight of a couple dozen troopers in their immediate front (despite the phrase “shattered brigades” in the text narrative at the end of the “Gettysburg” movie, Buford’s division had not been shattered, only wearied; they were withdrawn to Westminster to replenish ammunition, draw rations, re-shoe horses where needed and rest, and were very much involved in the pursuit after G-burg—read the account of Buford’s no-nonsense handling of a Southern spy captured between Westminster and the Potomac).

JEB Stuart

On the Southern side, Confederate infantry may have thought more highly of Jeb Stuart for the reputation he had built, but were singularly unimpressed with his Gettysburg Campaign wagon-train-raiding shenanigans.  But they were not shaken by his defeat by Custer on the East Cavalry Field, they didn’t even see it—it was out of sight and virtually out of the hearing even of the left-flank Confederate infantry.

The destruction of Pickett’s Division and failures of Pettigrew’s and Trimble’s infantry, coming after the “flat finish” of the second-day Confederate infantry attacks, are what really shook the ANV (and its commander) as never before.

This last not to undermine your statements vs friendly dragoons in the AWI, but out of genuine curiosity: where are some sources I could read re Infantry liking “having dragoons around” and the “infantry line” becoming unnerved at the dragoons’ absence? 

by Barry Kendall

Alfred Pleasonton

I have just completed another game of Gettysburg,  and this was a Union Major Victory (Confederate concede on turn 7 of Day 2 with ten blocks lost).

First off, for simplicity purposes, I count all blocks no matter the type. In this particular game all losses were infantry and both elites were lost.

I find that Gettysburg has a certain flow. On day 1, Lee has a shot at a major Victory. This is a little misleading as he actually has the smaller force for the first half of the day, and not much more than the Union by the end of the day.

Lee may have a chance on the first few turns of Day 2, but somewhere the tide turns. When that has happened is the critical point of the game, and the one that tests the player’s judgement.

If the South switches to the defensive a turn late, they can lose quite quickly. If they switch too soon, they might miss a chance at a major.

Switching from a desperate bid for victory, to a cool withdrawal, is such a major shift in thinking that it more frequently results in pushing too long.

Frequently,  the game then becomes very tense for the Union player, as now they hold the cards. They must push Lee over the edge without ending there themselves.

This is made tricky by approaching night. Come morning, Lee will have had a chance to recover, and Stuart will arrive!

In the best games, Lee manages to wrest initiative away from Meade, as the game see-saws back and forth.

This is why this game has so much replayability.

Mike Strand